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COMMERCIAL LAW
Michael J. Herbert*
I. INTRODUCTION
This survey of commercial law discusses all Supreme Court of
Virginia cases interpreting Virginia's version of the Uniform Com-
mercial Code (the "Code" or the "U.C.C.") during the previous
year, as well as statutory changes made to the Code in the most
recent session of the General Assembly. It also reviews significant
Code cases decided in the Virginia circuit courts and in the various
federal courts sitting in Virginia. It is current as of about May 1,
1990.
II. GENERAL PROVISIONS (ARTICLE 1)
Article 1 of the Code contains various general provisions applica-
ble to all or most Uniform Commercial Code transactions. Among
these general provisions is the good faith requirement. Although
there are a number of specific good faith requirements scattered
throughout the Code, Article 1 sets out good faith as a basic princi-
ple applicable even in the absence of a specific requirement:
"Every contract or duty within this act imposes an obligation of
good faith in its performance or enforcement."' This obligation is
central to the whole concept of contractual obligations under the
Code. The parties to a U.C.C. contract are expected to act within
the spirit of the contract. Thus, for example, understandings be-
tween the parties created by a usage of trade or a course of dealing
are ordinarily as much a part of the contract as the explicit
language.2
One of the issues arising under this general good faith require-
ment is whether the requirement is interpretive or substantive. In
other words, does the general good faith requirement merely estab-
* Professor of Law, T.C. Williams School of Law, University of Richmond; B.A., 1974,
John Carroll University; J.D., 1977, University of Michigan. The author gratefully acknowl-
edges the research assistance of David R. Hodnett and Mary K. Pettitt, T.C. Williams
School of Law, University of Richmond, Class of 1992.
1. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.1-203 (Add. Vol. 1965).
2. Id. official comment; id. § 8.1-205.
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lish a standard by which contractual obligations and the exercise of
contractual rights are measured, or is it an independent obliga-
tion? If it is merely the former, then there is no cause of action for
failure to act in good faith; good faith merely determines whether
some specific express or implied contractual obligation has been
properly performed and whether the enforcement of a particular
contractual right was in fact permissible under the circumstances.
If it is the latter, then there is a separate cause of action for the
failure to act in good faith, even though the complaining party can-
not point to any specific breach of the substantive terms of the
contract. Obviously, adoption of this latter view opens up poten-
tially broad and poorly defined avenues for litigation.
Until recently, it could safely be said that the courts nationwide
had rejected the notion that good faith created a free-standing
cause of action. However, in the past few years a number of courts
have arguably adopted that very position, and have held that a
party to a U.C.C. contract may seek court relief for the failure of
the other party to act in good faith. It is not clear that these cases
are really as significant as they may appear to be at first blush;
many of the cases could have been decided in much the same way
under the traditional, more limited view of good faith. They may,
however, be at least the opening wedge for more vigorous judicial
policing of contract performance.
No such wedge exists in Virginia. A recent Virginia circuit court
opinion squarely adopts the traditional rule that good faith is not
an independent obligation, and thus there is no independent cause
of action. Quoting an earlier federal case which examined Alabama
law, the Virginia court said:
Failure to act in good faith in the performance or enforcement of
contracts or duties under [Alabama's U.C.C.] does not state a claim
for which relief may be granted .... There is no indication, either
in the text or the comments, that Section 1-203 was intended to be
remedial rather than directive.4
The net result of all this is that, in Virginia, issues derived from
3. See, e.g., Colorado Interstate Gas Co. v. Natural Gas Pipeline Co. of Am., 661 F. Supp.
1448 (D. Wyo. 1987) rev'd in part and aff'd in part, 885 F.2d 683 (10th Cir. 1989).
4. Central Virginia Bank v. Bell, 16 Va. Cir. 209, 211 (Chesterfield 1989) (quoting Man-
agement Assistance, Inc. v. Computer Dimensions, Inc., 546 F. Supp. 666, 677 (N.D. Ga.
1982)).
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the Code's general good faith requirement will continue to be de-
termined only in the context of disputes over other contract terms.
III. SALES (ARTICLE 2)
A. Statute of Frauds-The Admissions Exception
Section 8.2-201(3)(b) of the Code5 contains a significant limita-
tion on the general requirement that contracts for sales of goods
must be evidenced by a writing if the price is $500 or more. Even if
there is no writing, the oral agreement will be an enforceable con-
tract if the existence of the agreement has been admitted in
litigation:
A contract which does not satisfy the [writing] requirements of
subsection (1) but which is valid in other respects is enforceable
(b) if the party against whom enforcement is sought admits in his
pleading, testimony or otherwise in court that a contract for sale was
made, but the contract is not enforceable under this provision be-
yond the quantity of goods admitted.
This "admissions exception" to the statute of frauds has sparked
a great deal of discussion in the cases and the law reviews over the
years. However, it has not resulted in reported litigation in Vir-
ginia. Thanks to W. Hamilton Bryson's Virginia Circuit Court
Opinions, a rather old but very useful admissions exception case
has now been unearthed.
Climatemakers, Inc. v. Bryant Heating and Air Conditioning,
Inc.7 involved an alleged oral agreement between Climatemakers
and Bryant, pursuant to which Bryant was to supply heating and
air conditioning equipment. Bryant noted that there was no writ-
ing sufficient to satisfy the statute of frauds. Climatemakers ar-
gued that there was an admission by Bryant sufficient to permit
the oral agreement to be enforced.8 The court agreed.
The important point in the case is that the witness for Bryant
5. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.2-201(3)(b) (Add. Vol. 1965).
6. Id.
7. 16 Va. Cir. 418 (Norfolk 1970). Note that the reported version incorporates two deci-
sions-the first overruled a demurrer; the second decided the merits of the case.
8. Id. at 418-19.
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never said in so many words "we had a contract" or "we had an
agreement." Indeed, it appears that there may have been some mi-
nor details of the agreement left to be ironed out." However, the
clear indication of the testimony as a whole was that a deal had
been struck, even though some aspects of it may have been left
open.
This is significant for two reasons. First, it is reflective of the
nature of Article 2 contracts. It is not necessary that all terms of
the contract be settled in advance; the fact that terms-even sig-
nificant terms-may be left open or left fluid does not prevent the
creation of a contract. 10 Second, the admissions exception is trig-
gered by a showing that an agreement had in fact been
struck-even if the word agreement or contract is never used.
One aspect of the case is less clear and more controversial: it
appears that the case was tried on the merits. It is not at all clear
that the admissions exception should be read to permit a plaintiff
to force a trial in the hope that an -admission might be elicited at
trial. The case law in other states is divided." Indeed, some courts
have held that a plaintiff's oral contract case should be dismissed if
the defendant states under oath that there was no oral agreement.
For example, one widely cited case held that an oral contract cause
of action could not go forward once the defendant submitted an
affidavit in which she denied that an oral agreement had been
made.'2 There the court was concerned that the purpose of the
statute of frauds would largely be lost if a plaintiff was able to
force trial on the merits on the mere hope that the defendant
might eventually admit to the existence of the agreement." Since
the issue is not directly discussed in Climatemakers, the question
remains an open one in Virginia.
B. Privity of Contract
One of the major traditional limitations on recovery for breach
of contract is the requirement of privity. In general, the only per-
sons who can sue on a contract are those who are parties to the
contract or who have succeeded to the rights of parties to the con-
9. Id. at 420-22.
10. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.2-204(3) (Add. Vol. 1965).
11. See J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 84-86 (3d ed. 1988).
12. DF Activities Corp. v. Brown, 851 F.2d 920 (7th Cir. 1988).
13. Id. at 922-23.
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tract. Generally speaking, incidental third party beneficiaries of
contracts have no rights under the contract; they cannot recover
for breach, even though they have been indirectly injured by the
breach. 4
This traditional rule has largely been limited or abolished inso-
far as products liability is concerned. Third parties who have been
injured by defective products can in many circumstances recover
from the retailer, distributor or manufacturer. In Virginia, privity
is generally not a defense with regard to breach of Article 2 war-
ranties15 or for any action for personal or property damage caused
by negligence. 6
This leaves the traditional structure intact for most suits in
which the plaintiff seeks recovery for economic loss. In Apac-Vir-
ginia, Inc. v. Department of Highways & Transportation,7 the
Court of Appeals of Virginia reaffirmed this. In Apac-Virginia, a
general contractor sought to recover from the Department of High-
ways and Transportation additional compensation allegedly owed
by the Department to a subcontractor. 8 (The case gives no reason
why the contractor, rather than the subcontractor, sought the re-
covery). The court held that the relevant statute did not permit
non-privity plaintiffs to recover, because unlike section 8.2-318, it
did not expressly eliminate the privity requirement.' 9
C. Duration of Express Warranties; Statute of Limitations
Under Article 2, the general statute of limitations period is four
years.20 The time at which the four year period begins to run, how-
ever, varies. Usually the time period begins to run when the seller
tenders delivery of the goods.2' However, if the seller makes a war-
ranty which explicitly extends to future performance of the goods,
and a breach of the warranty cannot be detected until such per-
formance occurs (or more likely does not occur), then the four year
14. An extended discussion of the current state of the law of third party beneficiaries can
be found in a recent Supreme Court of Virginia case, Copenhaver v. Rogers, 238 Va. 361,
384 S.E.2d 593 (1989).
15. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.2-318 (Add. Vol. 1965).
16. Id. § 8.01-223 (Repl. Vol. 1984).
17. - Va. App. -, 388 S.E.2d 841 (1990).
18. Id. at -, 388 S.E.2d at 842.
19. Id. at -, 388 S.E.2d at 842-43.
20. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.2-725(1) (Add. Vol. 1965).
21. Id. § 8.2-725(2).
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period does not begin to run until the breach of warranty is or
should have been discovered by the buyer.22 This means that the
effective limitations period for certain express warranties is much
longer than it is for other Article 2 promises.
Two Virginia cases touched on these issues during the last year.
A Supreme Court of Virginia case, Luddeke v. Amana Refrigera-
tion, Inc., s discusses the issue but was actually decided on defects
in the buyers' pleadings. A Virginia circuit court case, Ukrop's
Super Markets, Inc. v. U.S. Mineral Products Co.,24 deals with
what statements by a seller are warranties of future performance.
In Ukrop's, the seller stated that roofing material it sold "will
give long-term performance for years beyond our guarantee. '25 The
court held that this statement was too vague to constitute a war-
ranty of future performance.26 The question is one which has
caused considerable division of authority in other states. Some out-
of-state courts, like the Ukrop's court, require fairly definite state-
ments regarding future performance; others do not. One of the
most intriguing cases in the latter category dealt with a description
of goods as "[house] siding." It held that, since everyone expects
house siding to last for the life of the house, the mere use of the
term "siding" to describe the goods created a warranty of future
performance.2 7
IV. PERSONAL PROPERTY LEASES (ARTICLE 2A)
Several years ago, the National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws ("National Conference") and the American
Law Institute ("ALT") promulgated a new U.C.C. Article to cover
leases of personal property. Article 2A has had considerable
problems in the state legislatures, largely because of perceived defi-
ciencies in the official draft.28 Because of this, it has been adopted
by. only a few states, and has undergone extensive unofficial revi-
22. Id.
23. 239 Va. 203, 387 S.E.2d 502 (1990).
24. 17 Va. Cir. 368 (Richmond 1989).
25. Id. at 368.
26. Id.
27. Moore v. Puget Sound Plywood, Inc., 214 Neb. 14, 332 N.W.2d 212 (1983). For a dis-
cussion of this issue, see Herbert, What's in a Name?: The Implied Content of Express
Warranties, 12 U. DAYTOrN L, REV. 297 (1986).
28. The author's favorite discussion of these deficiencies can be found in Herbert, A Draft
Too Soon: Article 2A of the Uniform Commercial Code, 93 CoM. L.J. 413 (1988).
[Vol. 24:551
COMMERCIAL LAW
sion. Since the latter part of 1989, Article 2A has been under re-
view in Virginia by a joint committee of the Virginia State Bar and
the Virginia Bar Association. The tentative conclusions of that
committee are that Article 2A does indeed need revision and that
Virginia should to a large degree conform its revisions to those
promulgated in the most important commercial states.
Recently, the National Conference has agreed to make sweeping
amendments to the Official Text of Article 2A. (It is assumed that
the ALI will accept the National Conference's amendments.) These
amendments reflect many of the amendments already proposed by
the various states and improve upon them in some respects. It ap-
pears likely that many major commercial states, such as New York,
will accept these official amendments or something very like them.
If this occurs within the reasonably near future, there is a signifi-
cant possibility that the General Assembly will consider Article 2A,
with its official amendments, in the 1991 session. Although it is not
possible to predict the likelihood of passage, it is unlikely that
there will be organized opposition. Thus, there is a good chance
that Virginia will soon adopt Article 2A.
V. COMMERCIAL PAPER (ARTICLE 3)
A. Definition of a Note
Article 3 contains a complex set of rules defining negotiable in-
struments. As a general rule, Article 3 only applies to two particu-
lar kinds of documents, "notes" and "drafts." A 1989 Supreme
Court of Virginia case, in the midst of untangling a number of in-
surance law questions, briefly addressed the definition of an Article
3 note.
CUNA Mutual Insurance Society v. Norman29 involved a dis-
pute over credit life insurance. One of the issues presented was
whether or not an extension agreement executed by a debtor was
an Article 3 promissory note. The extension agreement merely
said, "I, Robert Norman do agree to pay off my share secured loan
on October 1, 1982. ''30 The court correctly held that the document
was not an Article 3 note.31 The court did not state specifically why
29. 237 Va. 33, 375 S.E.2d 724 (1989).
30. Id. at 35, 375 S.E.2d at 725.
31. Id. at 37-38, 375 S.E.2d at 726.
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it was not a note; however, at a minimum it was fatally deficient
because it failed to state the sum of money Norman was to pay.32
B. "Payment in Full" Checks
When two parties to a contract have a dispute over the total
amount owed by one party to the other, the party who owes money
will sometimes send the other party a check which includes lan-
guage to the effect that the check is "payment in full" for the dis-
puted obligation. Typically, the check is in the amount which the
sender believes it owes, not the amount which the recipient be-
lieves it is owed. Numerous cases have held that if the recipient
cashes or deposits the check, there may be an accord and satisfac-
tion which discharges the disputed obligation." This may be so
even if the recipient endorsed the check with words such as "under
protest" or "with reservation of rights. '3 4
In John Grier Construction Co. v. Jones Welding & Repair,
Inc.,3 5 the Supreme Court of Virginia ruled on a related issue: does
the Code rewrite the basic contract rules of accord and satisfac-
tion? John Grier Construction and Jones Welding were arguing
over the amount which Grier owed Jones Welding for work done
on a construction project. Grier sent Jones Welding a check for the
amount it admittedly owed. On the back of the check it put "these
monies reflect payment in full on the Carillon project."3 " Jones
Welding deposited the check in its bank account.3 7
Ordinarily, the fact that Jones Welding had deposited the check
would trigger discharge of the debt.3 8 However, it did not do so in
this case because Jones Welding (which deposited the check with-
out endorsement) did not know that the "full payment" language
32. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.3-104(1)(b) (Add. Vol. 1965). It is also likely, but less certain, that
the document would not be found to be in either order form or bearer -form. Id. § 8.3-
104(1)(d). It is also possible, although unlikely, that the language regarding payment would
not be construed as an unconditional promise to pay. Id. § 8.3-104(1)(b).
33. J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 11, at 607-08.
34. Most, but by no means all, courts have held this. See Rhone v. State Auto Mut. Ins.
Co., 858 F.2d 507 (11th Cir. 1988); Ennia Gen. Ins. Co. v. Auld, 506 So. 2d 62 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1987); Weidensaul v. Greenhouse Restaurant of Lawrence, 13 Kan. App. 2d 95, 762
P.2d 196 (1988); White & Summers, who do not like the majority rule, persist in ignoring it.
J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 11, at 608-10.
35. 238 Va. 270, 383 S.E.2d 719 (1989).
36. Id. at 271-72, 383 S.E.2d at 720.
37. Id.
38. See id. at 270, 383 S.E.2d at 719.
558 [Vol. 24:551
COMMERCIAL LAW
appeared on the back of the check. 9 In the court's view, an accord
and satisfaction requires a conscious relinquishment of the claim.
Since the offeree, Jones Welding, was not aware of the fact that an
accord was being offered, the mere fact that it deposited the check
did not create a contract. "[M]utual assent was lacking, and the
parties could not have reached an accord."40 Nothing in the Code
changes the basic contract principles underlying accord and
satisfaction.4
Grier also argued that there should have been an accord and sat-
isfaction because, even if Jones Welding never saw the "full pay-
ment" language, its bank did. This argument is based on section
8.4-205, which makes a bank its customer's agent for the purpose
of endorsing a check deposited in the customer's account.42 Grier
argued that this agency relationship should result in imputing the
bank's knowledge of language on the back of the check to its prin-
cipal, Jones Welding. The court properly rejected this argument,
noting that the scope of the bank's agency under section 8.4-204 is
very limited-it exists only for the purpose of facilitating collection
of checks.43
The only quibble one might have with the John Grier Construc-
tion decision is that it does not deal with the possibility that Jones
Welding could have known that the check was an offer of an ac-
cord even if it did not read the writing on the back of the check. If
two parties are involved in a dispute, and one party sends the
other a check for the exact amount it says it owes, it is arguable
that the recipient understands that this is an offer of an accord.
The facts stated in the John Grier Construction decision, however,
do not suggest that Jones Welding should have known that the
check was an offer of an accord. Jones Welding's claim was for
three separate change orders. Grier admitted that it owed Jones
Welding for the amount claimed on one of the three change orders,
but not for the other two.44 The fact that Jones Welding received
payment for one of three somewhat independent claims severely
undercuts any argument that it should have known what Grier was
39. Id. at 271-74, 383 S.E.2d at 720-22. There is no reason to believe that Jones Welding
was disingenuous about its lack of knowledge; both parties stipulated that Jones Welding
was unaware of the "full payment" language. Id. at 272-74, 383 S.E.2d at 721.
40. Id. at 271-74, 383 S.E.2d at 720-21.
41. Id. at 271-74, 383 S.E.2d at 721-22.
42. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.4-205(1) (Add. Vol. 1965).
43. 238 Va. at 273 n*, 383 S.E.2d at 721 n*.
44. Id. at 271-72, 383 S.E.2d at 720.
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doing. However, in cases which involve a single, indivisible claim, a
court might well conclude that the recipient of a check for an
amount equal to the undisputed part of the claim knew that the
sender was offering an accord.
C. Discharge by Reason of Fraudulent, Material Alteration
If a party to a negotiable instrument alters the instrument in a
way that is both material and fraudulent, any party whose contract
is changed by the alteration is discharged. 45 In other words, sup-
pose that A makes a note in the amount of $1,000 and negotiates it
to B. B alters the amount of the note to $10,000. A is no longer
obligated to pay even the original $1,000 (unless the instrument
reaches the hands of a holder in due course).46
In Business Bank v. Plank,1 the court examined, at some
length, the standard for determining whether an alteration is
"fraudulent." The case involved a promissory note which had been
altered by the addition of a "cognovit" (confession of judgment)
provision.48 The specific question before the court was whether
"fraudulent" as used in the discharge statute requires "actual"
fraud or merely "constructive" fraud; that is, whether the mere
fact that the holder attempted to add an obligation to the note is
fraud or whether the holder had to have deceitful intent. The court
reviewed the relevant Virginia and non-Virginia precedents, and
ruled that Virginia conformed to the majority rule, which is that
there must be a showing of actual fraud-that is "dishonesty or
deceit"-to trigger discharge. 49 Thus, the mere fact that an obliga-
tion on a negotiable instrument has been changed does not dis-
charge the obligor.
D. Forthcoming Statutory Changes
The National Conference and the ALI are completing work on
extensive amendments to Articles 3 and 4. These amendments, if
and when adopted in Virginia, will make significant changes to
many existing rules regarding checks, drafts and the bank collec-
tion process when the amendments are presented to the General
45. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.3-407(2) (Add. Vol. 1965).
46. Id. § 8.3-407(3).
47. 710 F. Supp. 619 (E.D. Va. 1989).
48. Id. at 620.
49. Id. at 621-22.
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Assembly, they will be reviewed in a future edition of this annual
survey.
VI. WIRE TRANSFERS (ARTICLE 4A)
The General Assembly has adopted new Article 4A, which deals
with the "wire transfer" (more accurately, electronic transfer) of
money. This new article deals primarily with wholesale commercial
transfers of money through electronic media.5 0 Although the
amount of money involved is immense,51 the number of lawyers
who will need to be concerned with the new Article is small, espe-
cially because it excludes most aspects of consumer transactions.2
Because of this, and because a discussion of Article 4A's complexi-
ties would push the length of this survey article beyond acceptable
limits, it is not discussed further. However, if and when significant
cases are decided under Article 4A, they will be included in future
editions of this annual review.
VII. SECURED TRANSACTIONS (ARTICLE 9)
A. Sale of Collateral; Deficiency Judgments
Article 9 imposes only two basic obligations on a secured party
who seeks to sell its collateral. In most cases, notice of the sale
must be given to the debtor.5 3 In addition, the sale must be com-
mercially reasonable.5
Previous editions of this survey have discussed whether a breach
by the secured party of either of these obligations precludes the
secured party from obtaining a deficiency judgment against the
debtor. Out-of-state courts are divided, and the Supreme Court of
Virginia has not ruled on the issue. The consensus of opinion
among federal courts in Virginia and its circuit courts is that Vir-
ginia would follow an "intermediate" rule. Under this rule, if the
secured party breaches either of its duties, it is presumed that the
collateral was worth the amount of the debt. This creates a pre-
sumption that the secured party should have received enough
money to cover the debt in full, and if it did not, the loss occurred
50. U.C.C. Article 4A Prefatory Note (1989).
51. About one trillion dollars per day is transferred by wire. Id.
52. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.4A-108 (Cur. Supp. 1990).
53. Id. § 8.9-504(3).
54. Id.
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through its own fault. If the secured party fails to rebut the pre-
sumption, it cannot get a deficiency judgment against the debtor; if
it does rebut the presumption it can get a deficiency judgment.5
There is now further support for the proposition that the inter-
mediate rule is the law in Virginia. In a narrow opinion, the Fed-
eral Bankruptcy Court for the Western District of Virginia held
that the intermediate rule (also known as the "no harm no foul"
rule) would be applied if (1) the only violation of the secured
party's duty was the failure to give notice, and (2) there was no
indication that the failure to give notice did any harm."6 This of
course leaves open the possibility that in different circumstances a
per se denial of a deficiency judgment might be appropriate.
A Virginia circuit court case, Chrysler Credit Corp. v. Fabrizio,5 7
also provides some support for the intermediate rule. More inter-
esting, however, was the court's ruling that, to obtain a deficiency
judgment, the secured party must put on detailed evidence regard-
ing the notice and the method, manner, time, place and terms of
the sale.58 The case was apparently an uncontested one, since the
only evidence presented was an affidavit of the plaintiff. 59 The
court was, quite properly, unwilling to enter a judgment based
solely on unsupported conclusory statements in the affidavit.
B. Formal Sufficiency of Financing Statements
Article 9's rules regarding the content of financing statements
are emphatically non-technical. Only a few requirements are im-
posed, and even these are read loosely. The only purpose of the
financing statement is to give notice and initiate inquiry. As long
as that purpose is met, the financing statement is adequate, even if
it contains minor errors.6
A recent Fairfax County Circuit Court case contains a helpful
discussion of the basic philosophy underlying Article 9 financing
statements. Teel Construction, Inc. v. Lipper, Inc."1 examined an
erroneous financing statement filed by Riggs National Bank on
55. See Herbert, Commercial Law: Annual Survey of Virginia Law, 23 U. RICH. L. REv.
523, 538-39 (1989).
56. In re Parrish, 110 Bankr. 229, 231-32 (W.D. Va. 1989).
57. 17 Va. Cir. 181 (Fairfax 1989).
58. Id. at 183.
59. Id. at 181.
60. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 8.9-110, -402(8) (Cum. Supp. 1990).
61. 18 Va. Cir. 397 (Fairfax 1990).
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property of Lipper which was claimed by Teel. The financing
statement had two errors. It misstated the debtor's address.6 2 It
also incorporated the incorrect address (which did not in fact ex-
ist) in its description of collateral.6 3 The court correctly held that
neither error was fatal.
C. Formal Sufficiency of Security Agreements
The Article 9 rules regarding the formal sufficiency of security
agreements are about as loose as those regarding financing state-
ments. There are some limits, however, and these were explored in
Moore v. First Virginia Bank-Damascus.4 In 1987, Zane Moore
and Nina Moore executed a $7,000 note and security agreement
under which they granted First Virginia Bank a security interest in
a bulldozer. In 1988, Zane Moore borrowed $2,504.29 from the
bank and executed a note. The second note included a preprinted
section headed by the words SECURITY INTEREST. Beneath
the heading was a block for a checkmark and a space to describe
collateral. The block was not checked and no collateral was de-
scribed. There was, however, another block which contained a
preprinted "X" beside the following phrase: "property securing
other loans with you may also secure this loan."65 The same lan-
guage and the same preprinted "X" appeared in the first note as
well. 6 This language is referred to in this article as the "catchall"
language.
The bank argued that the second note was secured on two alter-
native theories. First, the bank argued that the catchall language
in the first note meant that the original security interest covered
future advances (such as the $2,504.29 loan). Second, it was argued
that the catchall language in the second note incorporated by ref-
erence the description of collateral in the first note. 7 The court
rejected both arguments.6 8
62. Id. at 397.
63. Id. at 397, 400.
64. 16 Va. Cir. 111 (Washington 1989).
65. Id. at 111-12.
66. Id.
67. There was also language on the back of the note which granted a security interest in
accessions. The court properly held that this added nothing to the bank's basic argument,
since, unless the document was sufficient to create a security interest in some original collat-
eral, there could be no security interest in accessions to the original collateral. Id. at 117.
68. Id. at 114-17.
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The court was probably correct. The requirements for a security
interest are a statute of frauds; they are intended to provide writ-
ten evidence that the debtor agreed to give collateral for an obliga-
tion. The writings were, at best, extremely ambiguous. Nothing
was typed or handwritten on the form which indicated that collat-
eral was given to secure the second note. The only indication that
collateral was taken appeared in preprinted form. Moreover, it ap-
pears that the form used was not merely for secured loans, but
rather for both secured and unsecured loans. 9 It was thus at best
unclear from the documents whether the bank asked for collateral,
let alone whether the debtor agreed to provide it. In addition, Zane
Moore's intent could not be determined by oral evidence-he was
dead. 0 While that fact does not formally enter into the court's rea-
soning, it underscores the policy underlying all statutes of
frauds-that certain contracts should not be established solely on
the oral testimony of one party.
D. Effect of Negligent Release of Collateral on Co-obligor
In Central Virginia Bank v. Bell,71 discussed above, 2 Bell and
Harlan had obtained credit from Central Virginia Bank. The debt
was secured by Bell's truck. When Bell and Harlan defaulted, the
bank repossessed the truck, then subsequently returned it to Bell,
who absconded with it.7 s
Harlan argued that the bank had been negligent in returning the
truck to Bell. This type of issue usually arises under the Article 3
provisions dealing with the rights of accommodation parties and
other sureties; in general, an unjustified impairment of collateral
(which the bank's actions might have been) will discharge any
surety.74 However, it appears that Harlan was not a surety but
rather a co-principal. It is well-established in most courts that co-
principals do not have- the benefit of the Article 3 rules regarding
impairment of collateral. 6 Consequently, Harlan asked for relief
69. For example, the provision relating to accessions, discussed supra note 67, was con-
tained in a section captioned "ADDITIONAL TERMS-SECURED LOANS ONLY." Id. at
117. The wording of the caption indicates that the form had a dual secured/unsecured loan
function.
70. Id. at 111.
71. 16 Va. Cir. 209 (Chesterfield 1989).
72. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
73. 16 Va. Cir. at 209.
74. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.3-606(1)(b) (Add. Vol. 1965).
75. See J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 11, at 588-90.
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under section 8.9-207, which imposes upon a secured party in pos-
session the obligation of due care. This provision states, in part:
"(1) A secured party must use reasonable care in the custody and
preservation of collateral in his possession. . . (3) A secured
party is liable for any loss caused by his failure to meet any obliga-
tion imposed by the preceding subsections but does not lose his
security interest.17 6
Generally, the secured party's duty under this provision has
been limited to the preservation of the physical integrity of the
collateral." However, there is some support for the proposition
that it can be used to protect a co-obligor from the secured party's
improper return or release of the collateral.78 The Central Virginia
Bank court adopted this rule and held that the bank could be'lia-
ble to Harlan for any damages caused by negligent return of the
truck to Bell.79
E. Changes in Filing Office Procedures
One of the eternal complaints of commercial lawyers is the diffi-
culties encountered in dealing with filing offices. Generally, a se-
cured party who has filed proper financing statements in the right
places is protected against third party claimants, even if the fi-
nancing statements get lost in a bureaucratic morass. Potential
buyers and prospective lenders hope to find any financing state-
ments that are filed on the goods they want to buy or lend against,
so that they do not subsequently discover that Friendly Finance or
Bob's Bank has rights superior to theirs. Tracking those financing
statements down, however, can occasionally be quite a challenge.
While it is undoubtedly true that the Commonwealth's filing of-
fices are the envy of the world, the General Assembly in 1990
tinkered with a few provisions of Article 9 for the purpose of facili-
tating access to Article 9 filings. The new requirements are:
1. The index of financing statements must now include the year
in which each financing statement was filed;"0
2. All subsequent filings which affect the initial filing must be
76. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.9-207(1), (3) (Add. Vol. 1965).
77. See, e.g., Tepper v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 376 So. 2d 35 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979).
78. Signer v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust, 455 F.2d 382 (6th Cir. 1971).
79. 16 Va. Cir. 209, 212 (Chesterfield 1989).
80. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.9-403(4) (Cum. Supp. 1990).
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indexed in the same manner as the initial financing statement.
These subsequent filings include continuation statements, termina-
tion statements, assignments, and releases of collateral;"1 and
3. Financing statements (which generally lapse five years after
they are filed) must be retained for at least one year after they
lapse or are terminated, and must be retained after that one year
period if "litigation is threatened or pending and written notice [of
the litigation] has been filed with the court." 2
There are two obvious purposes for these reforms. First, they
help insure that changes in initial filings can be traced. Second,
they provide for longer retention of existing filings. The latter is
significant because a filing may still be important even if it has
lapsed; e.g., in litigation relating to a pre-lapse disposition of the
collateral by the debtor.
81. Id.; see also id. §§ 8.9-404(2), -405(2), -406(1).
82. Id. § 8.9-403(7).
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